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Abstract. We consider a stochastic online problem where n applicants ar-
rive over time, one per time step. Upon arrival of each applicant their cost
per time step is revealed, and we have to fix the duration of employment,
starting immediately. This decision is irrevocable, i.e., we can neither extend
a contract nor dismiss a candidate once hired. In every time step, at least one
candidate needs to be under contract, and our goal is to minimize the total
hiring cost, which is the sum of the applicants’ costs multiplied with their
respective employment durations. We provide a competitive online algorithm
for the case that the applicants’ costs are drawn independently from a known
distribution. Specifically, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 2.965
for the case of uniform distributions. For this case, we give an analytical lower
bound of 2 and a computational lower bound of 2.148. We then adapt our al-
gorithm to stay competitive even in settings with one or more of the following
restrictions: (i) at most two applicants can be hired concurrently; (ii) the dis-
tribution of the applicants’ costs is unknown; (iii) the total number n of time
steps is unknown. On the other hand, we show that concurrent employment
is a necessary feature of competitive algorithms by proving that no algorithm
has a competitive ratio better than Ω(
√
n/ logn) if concurrent employment is
forbidden.
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2 DISSER ET AL.
1. Introduction
The theory of optimal stopping is concerned with problems of finding the best
points in time to take a certain action based on a sequence of sequentially observed
random variables. Problems of this kind are ubiquitous in the area of operations
research, e.g., when hiring, selling, purchasing, or procurement decisions are made
based on the partial observation of a sequence of offers with known statistical
properties. In one of the most basic stopping problems, a gambler sequentially
observes realizations x1 ∼ X1, x2 ∼ X2, . . . of a series of independent random
variables. After being presented a realization xi ∼ Xi, the gambler has to decide
immediately whether to keep the realization xi as a prize, or to continue gambling
hoping for a better realization. For this setting, the famous prophet inequality
due to Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling (cf. [18, 19]) asserts that the best stopping
rule of the gambler achieves in expectation at least half the optimal outcome of a
prophet that foresees the realizations of all random variables and, thus, gains the
expected maximal realization of all variables.
After the surprising result of Krengel et al., prophet-type inequalities were pro-
vided for several generalizations of their model, including settings where both the
gambler and the prophet may stop multiple times (cf. Kennedy [16], Alaei [1]),
settings where both choose a set subject to matroid constraint (cf. Kleinberg and
Weinberg [17]), polymatroid constraints (cf. Du¨tting and Kleinberg [6]), and general
constraints (cf. Rubinstein [22]).
In light of this remarkable progress in establishing prophet-type inequalities for
various stochastic environments, two remarks are in order. First, the known results
consider maximization problems only. While obviously important as a model for
situations where, e.g., items are to be sold and offers for the items arrive over time,
they do not capture the “dual” problem where items need to be procured. In fact,
minimization problems in stochastic environments turn out to be much harder, as
any stopping rule does not allow for a constant factor approximation compared to
the prophet’s outcome, even in the most basic case of single stopping and i.i.d.
distributions (cf. Esfandiari et al. [7]). Second, the models above are inherently
static in the sense that the objective depends only on the set of chosen realizations
at the end of the sequence. This is a reasonable assumption when the underlying
selling or purchase decisions have a long-term impact, and the time during which
the sequence of random variables is observed can be neglected. On the other hand,
they fail to capture the natural situation where realizations are observed for a long
period of time and selling or procurement decisions are taking effect even while
further offers are observed.
To illustrate the key differences between static and dynamic settings, consider a
firm that in each time step needs to be able to perform a certain task in order to be
operational. Traditionally, the firm could advertise a position and hire an applicant
able to perform the task. Assuming that the firm strives to minimize labour cost,
this leads to a (static) prophet-type problem where the costs of the applicants
are drawn from a distribution and the firm strives to minimize the realized costs.
Alternatively, online marketplaces like oDesk.com and Freelance.com provide the
opportunity to hire applicants with a limited contract duration and to possibly hire
another contractor when a new offer with lower cost arrives. The constant rise of
the revenue generated by these platforms (reaching 1 billion USD in 2014) suggests
that the latter approach has growing economic importance [25].
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Hiring employees for a limited amount of time leads to a new kind of stopping
problem where the ongoing observation period overlaps with the duration of con-
tracts, and active contracts need to be maintained over time while receiving new
offers. To model these situations, we study a natural setting where at least one
contract needs to be active at each point in time, while there is no additional ben-
efit of having more than one active contract.1 This covering constraint renders it
beneficial to accept good offers even when other contracts are still active, and a key
challenge is to manage the tradeoff between accepting good offers while avoiding
contract overlaps.
Specifically, we assume that in every time step i ∈ [n] we observe the cost of the
i-th applicant xi, where the values xi are drawn i.i.d. from a common distribution
X. In each time step i, we have to decide on a number of time steps ti for which to
hire the i-th applicant. This duration is fixed irrevocably at time i and extension or
shortening of this duration is impossible later on. Hiring applicant i with realized
cost xi results in costs of xiti. We are interested in minimizing the expected total
hiring cost Ex1∼X,...,xn∼X
[∑n
i=1 tixi
]
, subject to the constraint that at least one
applicant is under employment at all times.
1.1. Results and Outline. When the total number of time steps and the distri-
bution are known, the dynamic stopping problem considered in this paper can be
solved by a straightforward dynamic program (DP). The DP maintains a table of
n2 optimal threshold values depending on the number of remaining covered and
uncovered time steps. Like other optimal solutions for similar stochastic optimiza-
tion problems, the DP suffers from the fact that it relies on the exact knowledge of
the distribution and the number of time steps, and does not allow to quantify the
optimal competitive ratio.
The results we give in this paper address these shortcomings. We give online
algorithms with constant competitive ratios, and in doing so, we prove that the
optimal online algorithm also gives a constant competitive ratio for any cost distri-
bution that is known upfront. Our techniques are robust with respect to incomplete
information and can be extended to the case where the cost distribution and/or the
total number of time steps is unknown, while still providing a constant competitive
ratio. Furthermore, our approach is conceptually simple, efficient and not tailored
to specific distributions.
For ease of exposition, we present our algorithm in incremental fashion starting
with a simplified version for uniform distributions in § 4.1. The algorithm maintains
different threshold values over time and hires applicants when their realized cost is
below the threshold. By relating the execution of the algorithm with a Markov chain
and by analyzing its hitting time, we bound the competitive ratio of the algorithm.
In § 4.2, we refine the algorithm and its analysis to show that it is 2.965-competitive
in the uniform case. We provide an analytical lower bound of 2 for the best possible
competitive ratio via a relaxation to the Cayley-Moser-Problem (cf. Moser [20]),
and we give a computational lower bound of 2.14.
Subsequently, in § 5, we generalize the algorithm to arbitrary distributions. Here,
the main technical difficulty is to obtain a good estimation of the offline optimum.
As we bound the offline optimum by a sum of conditional expectations given that
1We discuss a relaxation of the strict covering constraint in Section 9.
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the value lies in an intervals bounded by exponentially decreasing quantiles of the
distribution, we are able to derive a competitive ratio of 6.052.
In § 6, we further generalize our techniques to give a constant competitive al-
gorithm for the case where the distribution is unknown a priori. The main idea of
the algorithm is to approximate the quantiles of the distribution by sampling.
Finally, in § 7, we show that our algorithms remain competitive in the case that
at most two applicants may be employed concurrently. We also extend our results
to the case where the total number of applicants is unknown. In contrast to this,
we show that the best possible online algorithm without concurrent employment
has competitive ratio Θ(
√
n/ log n), even for uniform distributions.
To improve readability, we relegate the formal analysis of the underlying Markov
chains to § 8.
1.2. Related Work. The interest in optimal stopping rules for sequentially ob-
served random experiments dates at least as far as to Cayley [4] who asked for the
optimal stopping rule when n tickets are drawn without replacement from a known
pool of N tickets with different rewards. See also Ferguson [8] for more historical
notes on this problem. Cayley solved this problem by backwards induction, an
approach later formalized by Bellman [3]. Moser [20] studied Cayley’s problem for
the case that N is large and the N rewards are equal to the first N natural num-
bers. In that case, the problem can be approximated by n draws from the uniform
distribution and Moser provided an approximation of the corresponding threshold
values of the optimal stopping rule. For similar results for other distributions, see
Gilbert and Mosteller [10], Guttman [12] and Karlin [15]. In § 4.3, we will use the
asymptotic behavior of the threshold due to Gilbert and Mosteller [10] to obtain a
lower bound for our problem.
Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling (cf. [18, 19]) studied optimal stopping rules for
arbitrary independent, non-negative, but not necessarily identical random variables.
Their famous prophet inequality asserts that the expected reward of a gambler who
follows the optimal stopping rule (that can still be found using backwards induc-
tion) is at least half the expected reward of a prophet who knows all realizations
beforehand and will stop the sequence at the highest realization. Samuel-Cahn [24]
showed that the same guarantee can be obtained by a simple stopping rule that uses
a single threshold rather than n different thresholds as the solution of the dynamic
program. Hill and Kertz [14] surveyed some variations of the problem.
More recently, Alaei [1] considered the setting where both the prophet and the
gambler stop k ∈ N times and receive the sum of their realizations as rewards and
gave an algorithm with competitive ratio 1− 1√
k+3
. For a more general setting in
which the selection of both the gambler and the prophet is restricted by a matroid
constraint, Kleinberg and Weinberg [17] showed a tight competitive ratio of 1/2.
Du¨tting and Kleinberg [6] generalized this result further to polymatroid constraints.
Go¨bel et al. [11] studied a prophet inequality setting where a solution is feasible if
it forms an independent set in an underlying network. They gave an online algo-
rithm that achieves a O(ρ2 log n)-approximation where ρ is a structural parameter
of the network. Very recently, Rubinstein [22] studied the problem for general
downward-closed constraints. He gave a O(log n log r)-approximation where r is
the cardinality of the largest feasible set and showed that no online algorithm can
be better than a O(log n/ log log n)-approximation. For a generalization towards
non-linear valuations functions, see Rubinstein and Singla [23].
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The recent interest in prophet inequalities is due to an interesting connection to
mechanism design problems that was first made by Hajiaghayi et al. [13]. They
remarked that threshold rules used to prove prophet inequalities correspond to
thruthful online mechanisms with the same approximation guarantee as the prophet
inequality. Chawla et al. [5] noted that posted pricing mechanisms for revenue
maximization can be derived from prophet inequalities by using the framework
of virtual values due to Myerson [21]. As our algorithms operate on the basis of
threshold values as well they can also be turned into truthful mechanisms. However,
the exact properties of these mechanisms deserve further investigation.
Esfandiari et al. [7] considered the minimization version of the classical prophet
inequality setting. They showed that even for i.i.d. random variables, no stopping
rule can achieve a constant approximation to the cost of a prophet. This is in
contrast to our results for the dynamic prophet inequality setting as we obtain a
constant factor approximation even without knowledge of the distributions or n.
Further related are secretary problems (cf. Ferguson [8] for a review), and in
particular secretary problems where the values are drawn from i.i.d. distributions
as considered by Bearden [2]. The main difference to our model is that in secretary
problems the objective is to maximize the probability of selecting the best outcome.
Yet, our algorithm developed in § 6 for solving the case of unknown distributions is
reminiscent of the optimal stopping rules for secretary problems as it also employs
a sampling phase in which the distribution is learned before hiring an applicant.
Very recently, Fiat et al. [9] studied a dynamic secretary problem where secretaries
are hired over time. In contrast to our work, they consider a maximization problem,
and the contract duration is fixed.
2. Preliminaries
For a natural number n ∈ N let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We consider a sequence x1 ∼ X,
x2 ∼ X, . . . , xn ∼ X of n i.i.d. random variables drawn from a probability distribu-
tion X. Throughout this work, we assume that X is a continuous distribution with
cumulative distribution F and probability density function f . Moreover, we assume
that X assigns positive probability to non-negative values only, i.e., F (0) = 0. In
every time step i ∈ [n] the cost xi of the i-th applicant is revealed and we must
decide the number of time steps ti the applicant is hired. The duration of the
employment ti is fixed irrevocably at time i; no extension or shortening of this
duration at any further point in time is possible. Hiring applicant i with realized
cost xi for ti time steps results in costs of xiti. The objective is to minimize the ex-
pected total cost of hired applicants E[
∑
i∈[n] tixi] := Ex1∼X,...,xn∼X
[∑
i∈[n] tixi
]
subject to the constraint that at least one applicant is employed at each point in
time i ∈ [n], i.e., maxj≤i{j + tj} ≥ i for all i ∈ [n].
This is an online problem since, at time i, we only know about the realizations
x1, . . . , xi up to time i and have to base our decision about the hiring duration ti of
the i-th applicant only on this information and previous hiring decisions t1, . . . , ti−1.
We are interested in obtaining online algorithms that perform well compared to an
omniscient prophet. Let Optn be the expected cost of an optimal offline algorithm
(i.e., a prophet) knowing the n realizations in advance and let Algn be the expected
cost of a solution of an online algorithm. Then the competitive ratio of the online
algorithm Algn is defined as lim supn∈NE [Algn] /E [Optn]. We call an algorithm
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competitive if its competitive ratio is constant, and call it strictly competitive if
even supn∈NE [Algn] /E [Optn] is constant.
We use well-known facts from higher order statistics of random variables to
obtain the following.
The expected total cost of an optimal offline algorithm isE [Optn] =
∑
i∈[n]
∫∞
0
(
1−
F (x)
)i
dx.
Proof. Proof. In every step, the optimal offline algorithm employs the applicant
with the lowest cost that has arrived so far. We have
E [Optn] = E
[∑
i∈[n] minj∈[i]{xj}
]
=
∑
i∈[n]
E
[
minj∈[i]{xj}
]
=
∑
i∈[n]
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
minj∈[i]{xj} > x
]
dx
=
∑
i∈[n]
∫ ∞
0
(
1− F (x))i dx,
as claimed. 
3. An Optimal Online Algorithm
We begin by describing an optimal online algorithm that uses dynamic pro-
gramming. Let C(i, j) denote the expected overall cost if there are i time steps
remaining, and if the next j time steps are already covered by an existing contract.
As a boundary condition, we have that C(i, i) = 0 for all i, since in this case no
further applicants need to be hired.
Suppose that C(i′, j′) has already been computed for all i′ < i and all j′ ≤ i′.
First we describe how to compute C(i, 0). Suppose that we draw an applicant with
cost x. Since there are no existing contracts, we must hire this applicant for at least
one time step, and we will obviously hire this applicant for at most i time steps. If
we hire the applicant for r time steps, our overall cost will be rx+ C(i− 1, r − 1).
Thus, the optimal cost for an applicant costing x can be written as
min
1≤r≤i
{rx+ C(i− 1, r − 1)} .
Therefore, we have
C(i, 0) =
∫ ∞
0
min
1≤r≤i
{rx+ C(i− 1, r − 1)} f(x) dx.(1)
Now we suppose that C(i, j) has been computed for j < i and describe how to
compute C(i, j + 1). The analysis is similar as before, but in this case we have the
additional option to reject an applicant and wait one more time step. The cost of
waiting one step is given by C(i− 1, j), so we get the following expression
C(i, j + 1) =
∫ ∞
0
min
{
C(i− 1, j), min
j+1<r≤i
{rx+ C(i− 1, r − 1)}
}
f(x) dx.(2)
If C(i, j) has been computed for all i ≤ n and all j ≤ i, then there is a straightfor-
ward online algorithm that achieves expected cost C(n, 0). This algorithm simply
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waits for the cost x of each applicant to be revealed, and then chooses the action
that minimizes the expression in the above equations.
3.1. Analysis. The computational efficiency of this algorithm depends on the diffi-
culty of evaluating the integrals in Equations (1) and (2). For the simple case where
the cost distributions are uniform, the right and side of both equations boild down
to finding the piecewise minimum over at most n linear functions, which can easily
be computed. For other distributions, the algorithm may be slower. It is worth
noting that the algorithm cannot be applied in the case where the distribution is
unknown. For the case of a known distributions, we conclude the following.
Theorem 3.1. The dynamic program given by eqs. (1) and (2) yields an optimal
online algorithm.
Before we move on, we describe some shortcomings of this algorithm that we
seek to address in the remainder of this paper. The first issue of the algorithm is
that, although it does provide an optimal competitive ratio, it is unclear how to
analyze the algorithm, and in particular we do not know what competitive ratio
the algorithm guarantees. Secondly, the algorithm is very complicated to describe
as it uses at least n2 different threshold values to decide the hiring duration of an
applicant, and these threshold values are specifically tailored to the distribution in
question. In the subsequent sections, we show that there exist algorithms with a
constant competitive ratio, and in doing so we prove that the competitive ratio of
the optimal online algorithm is also constant. Thirdly, the optimal online algorithm
requires both the cost distribution and the total number of time periods to be known
ahead of time. In contrast, in the following we develop an online algorithm with
constant competitive ratio that still works even if neither information is known.
4. Uniformly Distributed Costs
In this section, we give two algorithms with constant competitive ratios in the
case where applicants’ costs are distributed uniformly. By shifting/rescaling we
may assume without loss of generality that X = U [0, 1], i.e., that the costs are
distributed uniformly in the unit interval. Using Proposition 2, we obtain the
following expression for the expected cost of the offline optimum.
Lemma 4.1. E
[
Optn
]
= Hn+1 − 1 for all n ∈ N, where Hn is the n-th harmonic
number.
Proof. Proof. By Proposition 2, E
[
Optn
]
=
∑
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
(1 − x)i dx = ∑i∈[n] 1i+1 =
Hn+1 − 1. 
4.1. A First Competitive Algorithm. We start with our first online algorithm
for uniform distributions (cf. Algorithm 1). The main idea of the algorithm is that
whenever we hire an applicant of cost x, we afterwards seek an applicant of cost
x/2. The expected time until such an applicant arrives is 2/x.
If we set our hiring time equal to this expectation, we would leave a considerable
probability that we do not encounter any cheaper applicants before the hiring time
runs out. Instead, we hire the applicant for 4/x steps and iteratively relax our
hiring threshold after a certain time.
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Algorithm 1: A 8.122-competitive algorithm for uniformly distributed costs.
τ ← 1 ; // threshold cost
t← 1 ; // remaining time with current threshold
for i← 1, . . . , n do
t← t− 1;
if xi ≤ τ then
hire applicant i for 4/τ time steps;
if i+ 4/τ > n then
stop;
τ ← τ/2; t← 1/τ
else if t = 0 then
τ ← 2τ ; t← 1/τ ;
More precisely, assume x = 1/2j for some integer j. We then hire the applicant
for time
4
x
>
4
x
− 1 = 2
x
+
1
x
+
1
2x
+
1
4x
+ · · ·+ 1.(3)
This way, if we do not find an applicant of cost at most x/2 during the next 2/x
time steps, we continue seeking for an applicant with cost x for 1/x time steps, and
so on. The geometric sum (3) just leaves enough time until we eventually seek for
an applicant with cost at most 1, who is surely found.
To accommodate the fact that the costs of applicants are not powers of 2, in
general, we maintain a threshold cost τ that is a power of 2 and reduce the threshold,
whenever a new applicant is hired, see Algorithm 1 for a formal description. Finally,
once an applicant is employed long enough to cover all remaining time steps, we
stop. Importantly, this allows us to bound the lowest possible value of τ to be
2−dlogne+2.2 If an applicant is hired below this threshold, the hiring time is 4/τ ≥ n.
In other words, during the course of the algorithm the threshold cost τ can only
take values of the form 2−j for j ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, where k = dlog(n)e−1. This allows
us to describe the evolution of τ with a Markov chain M with k+1 states as follows.
State k is the absorbing state that corresponds to the event that we succeeded in
hiring an applicant at cost at most the threshold value 2−(k−1) = 2−dlogne+2. Each
other state j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} corresponds to the event that the threshold value
reaches τ = τj := 2
−j , see Figure 1 (a). Each transition of the Markov chain from
a state j to a state j − 1 corresponds to the failure of finding an applicant below
the threshold τj = 2
−j for 1/τj = 2j time steps, resulting in a doubling of the
threshold cost. Each transition of the Markov chain from a state j to a state j + 1
corresponds to the hiring of an applicant resulting in the reduction of the threshold
cost. We can therefore use the expected total number of state transitions of the
Markov chain when starting at state 0 to bound the number of hired applicants
overall.
Let pj denote the transition probability from state j to state j + 1; i.e., when in
state j, the Markov chain transitions to state j+ 1 with probability pj and to state
2Here and throughout, we denote the logarithm of n to base 2 by log(n) and the natural
logarithm of n with ln(n).
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0 1 2 . . . k−1 k
1
(1− 1/2)2
1− (1− 1/2)2
(1− 1/4)4
1− (1− 1/4)4
(1− 1/8)8
(1− 1/2k−2)2k−2
(1− 1/2k−1)2k−1
1− (1− 1/2k−1)2k−1
(a) Original Markov chain M .
0 1 2 . . . k−1 k
1
1/e
1− 1/e
1/e
1− 1/e
1/e
1− 1/e
1/e
1− 1/e
(b) Markov chain Mˆ(p, k) with homogeneous transition probabilities p = 1− 1/e.
Figure 1. Markov chains M modeling the expected number of
hired applicants of Algorithm 1. Nodes correspond to states.
State k = dlog ne − 1 is absorbing.
j− 1 with probability 1− pj . The probability that we fail to find an applicant with
cost at most τ during 1/τ time steps is bounded by
1− pj = (1− τ)1/τ ≤ 1
e
,
i.e., pj ≥ 1 − 1/e. We set p = 1 − 1/e and consider the Markov chain Mˆ(p, k) with
homogeneous transition probability p shown in Figure 1 (b). As we will show in the
following lemma, the total number of state transitions to reach state k in Markov
chain Mˆ(p, k) provides an upper bound on the total number of state transitions to
reach state k in Markov chain M . The analysis of Mˆ(p, k) then yields the following
result.
Lemma 4.2. Starting in state 0 of Markov chain M with k = dlog(n)e − 1, the
expected number of state transitions is at most eke−2 .
Proof. Proof. Let k = dlog ne − 1 and p = 1− 1/e, and consider the Markov chain
Mˆ(p, k) shown in Figure 1 (b). We first claim that the expected number of state
transitions when starting in state 0 in Markov chain M is bounded from above
by that in Markov chain Mˆ(p, k). To see this, consider an arbitrary state j and
consider the stochastic process that operates as M with the exception that the first
time state j is visited, transition probabilities are as in Mˆ(p, k). Since Mˆ(p, k) has
a higher probability to transition to a state with low index and the only absorbing
state is k, this does not decrease the expected number of state transitions to state
j in M . Iterating this argument, we derive that also the stochastic process where
state j always transitions as in Mˆ(p, k) has a higher number of state transitions
to state j. Iterating this argument over all states proves that the expected total
number of state transitions in M is upper bounded by the expected total number
of state transitions in Mˆ(p, k).
In Lemma 8.1 in § 8.1, we show that the expected number of visits for each state
in Mˆ(p, k) is upper bounded by 12p−1 =
e
e−2 . Since we start in state 0 and end after
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the first visit in state k, we conclude that the total number of state transitions of
Markov chain Mˆ(p, k) is bounded by( e
e− 2 − 1
)
+
k−1∑
i=1
e
e− 2 + 1 =
ek
e− 2 .
This gives the claimed result. 
We proceed to use Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 to obtain a first constant competitive
algorithm for uniform costs.
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 1 is strictly 8.122-competitive for uniform distributions.
Proof. Proof. Since τ decreases whenever an applicant is hired, we can bound the
number of hired applicants by the number of state transitions from a state j to
state j+ 1 of the Markov chain. The algorithm terminates at the latest when state
k = dlog(n)e − 1 is reached. If it ever reaches that point, it has hired at least k
applicants and every further hiring is mirrored by a state transition that decreases
the current state. By using Lemma 4.2 and only counting the transitions that
increase the state index, we can bound the expected number of hired applicants by
ek
e−2 − k
2
+ k =
(
e
e− 2 + 1
)
k
2
≤
(
e
e− 2 + 1
)
log n
2
.
Whenever we hire an applicant below threshold τ the cost of the applicant is uniform
in [0, τ ], so the expected cost is τ/2. Since the hiring period is 4/τ we get that
each hired applicant incurs an expected total cost of 2. The threshold τ for the
next candidate is independent of the exact cost of the last hire. Therefore we can
combine the expected cost per candidate with Lemma 4.1 and we obtain
E [Algn]
E [Optn]
≤ lnnHn+1 − 1 ·
1
ln 2
(
e
e− 2 + 1
)
.
Using Lemma 4.4 proven below where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant this
implies
E [Algn]
E [Optn]
≤
(
1 +
20
29
(
5
6
− γ
))
· 1
ln 2
(
e
e− 2 + 1
)
< 8.122,
as claimed. 
Lemma 4.4. For any n ∈ N, lnnHn+1−1 ≤ 1 + 2029
(
5
6 − γ
)
, where γ is the Euler-
Mascheroni constant.
Proof. Proof. First, note that
lnn
Hn+1 − 1 ≤
Hn − γ
Hn+1 − 1 = 1 +
1− γ − 1n+1
Hn+1 − 1 .
It suffices to prove that
sup
n∈N
1− γ − 1n+1
Hn+1 − 1 = supn∈N,n≥2
1− γ − 1n
Hn − 1 ≤
20
29
(
5
6
− γ
)
.
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In order to do so, we show that there is a unique n′ ∈ N≥2 with
1− γ − 1n−1
Hn−1 − 1 ≤
1− γ − 1n
Hn − 1 for all n ∈ N≥2, n ≤ n
′, and
1− γ − 1n
Hn − 1 ≥
1− γ − 1n+1
Hn+1 − 1 for all n ∈ N≥2, n ≥ n
′,
concluding that the supremum is attained at n′. Now we observe that
1− γ − 1n
Hn − 1 −
1− γ − 1n+1
Hn+1 − 1 ≥ 0
⇔ (Hn+1 − 1)
(
1− γ − 1
n
)
− (Hn − 1)
(
1− γ − 1
n+ 1
)
≥ 0
and
(Hn+1 − 1)
(
1− γ − 1
n
)
− (Hn − 1)
(
1− γ − 1
n+ 1
)
=
1
n+ 1
(
1− γ − 1
n
)
− 1
n
(Hn − 1) + 1
n+ 1
(Hn − 1)
=
1
n+ 1
(
1− γ − 1
n
)
− (Hn − 1) 1
n(n+ 1)
=
1
n(n+ 1)
(n(1− γ)−Hn) ,
which is greater or equal to 0 if and only if n ≥ 6. We conclude that the supremum
is attained at n′ = 6. We finish the proof by observing
lnn
Hn+1 − 1 ≤ 1 +
1− γ − 1n+1
Hn+1 − 1
≤ 1 + sup
n˜∈N≥2
1− γ − 1n˜
Hn˜ − 1
≤ 1 + 1− γ −
1
6
H6 − 1
= 1 +
20
29
(
5
6
− γ
)
,
for all n ∈ N. 
4.2. Improving the Algorithm. We proceed to improve the competitive ratio of
our algorithm as follows (cf. Algorithm 2). First, recall that, in Algorithm 1, we
hired an applicant below the current threshold of τj = 2
−j for 4/τj time units with
the rationale that
j+1∑
i=0
1
τi
=
j+1∑
i=0
2i = 2j+2 − 1 = 4
τj
− 1 < 4
τj
.
With this inequality, it is ensured that we can afford 1/τj+1 time steps to look
for an applicant below the threshold τj+1 and, in case we did not find a suitable
applicant, additional 1/τj time steps looking for an applicant below the threshold
τj , and so on, until the threshold is raised to 1 and we find a suitable applicant
with probability 1.
It turns out that it pays off to reduce both the hiring times and the time steps
we spend looking for an applicant below a given threshold uniformly by a factor of
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Algorithm 2: A 2.965-competitive algorithm for uniformly distributed costs.
τ ← 1 ; // threshold cost
t← 1 ; // time with threshold
for i← 1, . . . , n do
t← t− 1;
if xi ≤ τ then
while xi ≤ τ do
τ ← τ/2 ;
hire applicant i for d2c/τe time steps;
if i+ d2c/τe > n then
stop;
t← dc/τe
else if t = 0 then
τ ← 2τ ; t← dc/τe
c := 3/4. That is, when hiring an applicant below the threshold of τj , we hire only
for 4c/τj = 3/τj time units. To compensate for that we only look for an applicant
below threshold τj for d cτj e = d 34τj e time units. Note that for τ ∈ {1/2, 1} we round
all times to the next integer. For j ≥ 3, we then obtain
j+1∑
i=0
⌈
3
4τj
⌉
=
⌈
3
4
⌉
+
⌈
3
2
⌉
+
j+1∑
i=2
3
4τj
= 1 + 2 + 3
j+1∑
i=2
2i−2 = 3 · 2j = 3
τj
.
Similarly, we may check for j = 0 that d3/4e + d3/2e = 3 = 3/τ0, and for j = 1
that d3/4e+ d3/2e+ 3 = 6 = 3/τ1. Thus, we may conclude that the above choices
ensure that an applicant is under contract at all times.
Second, instead of reducing the threshold once by factor 2 when we hire a new
applicant, we repeatedly halve the threshold for as long as it is still greater or
equal to the actual cost of the new applicant. This way, we can ensure that the
cost for which a new applicant is hired is always uniformly distributed in [τ, 2τ)
(or possibly [0, 2τ) for the last hiring), where τ denotes the threshold after the
applicant is hired. Thus, the expected total cost of each applicant is 3τ2 · 2cτ = 3c
(or possibly 2c for the last hiring).
Once we hire an applicant with a cost below 2−j , the threshold τ after hiring is
at most 2−(j+1) so that the applicant is hired for at least d2 cτ e ≥ 2j+2c time steps.
This implies that we only need to account for thresholds of the form τj = 2
−j where
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , dlog(n/c)e−2}. We again capture the behavior of the algorithm with
a Markov chain (cf. Figure 2). To this end, states A0, A1, . . . , Ak and B0, B1, . . . , Bk
with k = dlog(n/c)e− 2 are introduced. We distinguish between the states Aj that
correspond to the algorithm looking for suitable applicants by comparing their cost
with τj = 2
−j , and states Bj that correspond to the event that the cost of our
current candidate is below the threshold τj = 2
−j . Each state Aj with j > 0 either
transitions to Aj−1 with probability (1 − pj), when no applicant for the current
threshold was found, or to Bj with probability pj . As for the previous Markov
chain, we have
(1− pj) = (1− τj)dc/τje ≤ e−c.
HIRING SECRETARIES OVER TIME 13
B0 B1 B2 . . . Bk−1 Bk
A0 A1 A2 . . . Ak−1 Ak
1
1
−
(1
−
1 /
2
)2
1
−
(1
−
1 /
4
)3
1
−
(1
−
2
−
k
+
1
)c
2
k
−
1
1
−
(1
−
2
−
k
)c
2
k
(1− 1/2)2 (1− 1/4)3 (1− 1/8)12 (1−2−k+1)c2k−1 (1− 2−k)c2k
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
(a) Original Markov chain N .
B0 B1 B2 . . . Bk−1 Bk
A0 A1 A2 . . . Ak−1 Ak
1
1
−
e−
c
1
−
e−
c
1
−
e−
c
1
−
e−
c
e−c e−c e−c e−c e−c
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
(b) Markov chain Nˆ(p, k) with homogenous transition probabilities p = 1− e−c.
Figure 2. Markov chains modeling the expected number of hired
applicants of Algorithm 2.
Similar to the previous section, we may consider the Markov chain with homogenous
transition probabilities p = 1−e−c shown in Figure 2 (b) instead, since we are only
interested in upper bounding the number of hired applicants. Each state Bj with
j < k transitions to Bj+1 or Aj+1 each with probability 1/2, since the cost x lies
with equal probability in [τ, 2τ) or [0, τ). State Bk is the only absorbing state of
the Markov chain. Our analysis of the Markov chain in § 8.2 yields the following
result.
Lemma 4.5. Starting in state A0 of Markov chain N , the expected number of
transitions from an A-state to a B-state is at most
h =
kp
3p− 1 −
4p(1− 2p)
(3p− 1)2 +
(
1− p
3p− 1
)2(
2(1− p)
1 + p
)k
(4)
where k = dlog(n/c)e − 2 and p = 1− e−c.
Proof. Let c = 3/4, k = dlog(n/c)e − 2, and p = 1 − e−c. We again argue that
we only overestimate the expected visiting times when considering Markov chain
Nˆ(p, k) instead of N . To see this, fix a state Aj , j = 0, . . . , k and consider the
stochastic process N ′ that follows Markov chain N , but, the first time state Aj is
visited, transitions according to the probabilities of Nˆ(p, k). As in all stochastic
processes we consider the expected number of visits of all states is decreasing in the
index of the starting state Aj , the expected number of visits of all states are not
smaller in N ′ than in N . Iterating this argument, we conclude that the expected
number of visits of all states in N does not exceed those in Nˆ(p, k).
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In Lemma 8.2 in § 8.2 we prove that the expected number of transitions from an
A-state to a B-state of Nˆ(p, k) is bounded from above by (4). 
As every transition from an A-state to a B-state corresponds to the hiring of a
candidate, bounding these transitions allows us to bound E [Algn]. Together with
the formula for E [Optn] proven in Lemma 4.1 we obtain an improved competi-
tive ratio. Numerically, the choice c = 3/4 yields optimizes the competitive ratio
yielding a strict competitive ratio of 2.965.
Theorem 4.6. For c = 3/4, Algorithm 2 is strictly 2.965-competitive for uniform
distributions.
Proof. Proof. Whenever an applicant is hired, the Markov chain transitions from
Aj to Bj for some value j ∈ [k]. The algorithm terminates at the latest when state
Bk is reached. We can thus bound the number of hired applicants by the expression
h of Lemma 4.5. Using Lemma 4.1 and the fact that the expected cost incurred by
each hired applicant is 3c (and 2c for the last hiring), we get
E [Algn]
E [Optn]
≤ 3hc− cHn+1 − 1 ≤ 2.965,
for c = 3/4 and all n. See Lemma 4.7 below for a proof of the last inequality. 
Lemma 4.7. Let c=3/4, p=1−e−c, k=dlog(n/c)e−2, and h = kp3p−1− 4p(1−2p)(3p−1)2 +(
1−p
3p−1
)2( 2(1−p)
1+p
)k
. Then, 3hc−cHn+1−1 ≤ 2.965 for all n.
Proof. Proof. Since the expression 3hc−c is constant as long as k = dlog(n/c)e−2 =
dlog(n/3)e is constant, the ratio 3hc−cHn+1−1 is maximized for some n of the form
n = 3 · 2`−1 + 1 with ` ∈ N. See also Figure 3 where the ratio is plotted as a
function of n. The claim of the lemma is easily verified for ` = 1, . . . , 6. For ` ≥ 7,
we obtain
h =
`p
3p− 1 −
4p(1− 2p)
(3p− 1)2 +
(
1− p
3p− 1
)2
·
(
2(1− p)
1 + p
)`
≤ `p
3p− 1 −
4p(1− 2p)
(3p− 1)2 +
(
1− p
3p− 1
)2
·
(
2(1− p)
1 + p
)7
(5)
<
`p
3p− 1 +
1
e
,
where for the first inequality we used that for p = 1−e−3/4 we have 2(1−p)/(1+p) =
2/(2e3/4 − 1) ≈ 0.618 < 1 and for the second inequality we evaluated (5) for
p = 1− e−3/4. For the Euler-Mascheroni constant γ ≈ 0.577 we obtain
3hc− c
H3·2`−1+2 − 1
<
9
4
(
`p
3p−1 +
1
e
)− 34
ln(3 · 2`−1 + 2)− (1− γ)
≤
9
4
(
`p
3p−1 +
1
e
)− 34
` ln(2) + ln(3)− ln(2)− (1− γ) ,(6)
where we used that the denominator is positive. Using that ln(3)− ln(2)−(1−γ) ≈
−0.017 < 0, elementary calculus shows that the expression in (6) is decreasing in
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`. Evaluating it for ` = 7 we obtain
3hc− c
H3·2`−1+2 − 1
≤ 2.965,
as claimed. 
4.3. Analytical Lower Bound. To obtain a lower bound on the competitive ra-
tio of any online algorithm, we study in this section a relaxation of the problem.
The relaxation allows to exploit an interesting connection to the classical stopping
problem with uniformly distributed random variables which is known under the
name Cayley-Moser problem, see Moser [20], Gilbert and Mosteller [10].
Consider the relaxation where we are allowed to hire an applicant for any (not
necessarily contiguous) subset of all future time steps, while still having to decide
on this set immediately upon arrival of the applicant. In this setting, there is
obviously no advantage of concurrent employment — once we hired an applicant
for some time slot, there is no benefit of hiring additional applicants for the same
time slot. Put differently, the decision whether to hire an applicant for some time
slot is independent of the decision for other time slots. Thus, the problem reduces
to simultaneously solve a stopping problem for each time slot t. That is, we need to
hire exactly one of the first t applicants for this time slot, while applicants appear
one by one and we need to irrevocably hire or discard each applicant upon their
arrival. By linearity of expectation, each of the n stopping problems can be treated
individually.
Gilbert and Mosteller [10] showed that, in the maximization version of the single
stopping problem with uniformly distributed values, the optimal stopping rule is a
threshold rule parametrized by t thresholds τ0, . . . , τt−1. The rule stops at a time
step when there are i remaining (unobserved) random variables and the realization
is above τi. The threshold values follow the recursion τ0 = 0 and τi+1 = (1 + τ
2
i )/2
for all i ≥ 1. Gilbert and Mosteller showed that the value τt is also the expected
revenue for the stopping problem with t slots.when following the optimal strategy.
They bound the expected revenue for all t by
τt ≥ 1− 2
t+ ln(t+ 1) + 1.767
.
By symmetry of the uniform distribution, for the corresponding single stopping
problem with uniformly distributed costs and minimization objective, this imme-
diately yields that the optimum expected cost 1 − τt is lower bounded by h(t) :=
2
t+ln(t+1)+1.767 .
Since we need to solve a stopping problem for each time slot 1, 2, . . . , n, and by
linearity of expectation, we get a lower bound on the expected cost of
∑n
t=1 h(t)
for the relaxed problem. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.1, for the offline opti-
mum of our original problem, we have Ex1∼U [0,1],...,xn∼U [0,1]
[
Optn
]
=
∑n
t=1 g(t) :=∑n
t=1
1
1+t . Since h(t) and g(t) are both monotonically decreasing, we can estimate∑n
t=1 h(t) ≥
∫ n+1
1
h(t) dt and
∑n
t=1 g(t) ≤
∫ n
0
g(t) dt. Also, since both integrals
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(b) n = 1, . . . , 10, 000
Figure 3. Competitive ratio of our algorithm (orange), and the
optimal online algorithm (blue) for uniformly distributed cost. The
lower bound via the Gilbert-Mosteller problem is shown in green.
tend to infinity for growing n, we can apply l’Hoˆpital’s rule and obtain
lim
n→∞
∑n
t=1 h(t)∑n
t=1 g(t)
≥ lim
n→∞
∫ n+1
1
h(t) dt∫ n
0
g(t) dt
= lim
n→∞
h(n+ 1)
g(n)
= lim
n→∞
2(n+ 1)
n+ 1 + log(n+ 2) + 1.767
= 2.
As
∑n
t=1 h(t) is the expected cost of an optimum online solution to the relaxed
problem, it is a lower bound on the expected cost of an optimum online solution to
the original problem, and we get the following bound.
Theorem 4.8. Asymptotically, for a uniform distribution, no online algorithm has
a competitive ratio below 2.
A plot of the lower bound
∑n
t=1 h(t)
Hn+1−1 as a function of n shown in Figure 3 reveals
that the lower bound converges very slowly. Even for n = 10, 000, the lower bound
is still below 9/5.
4.4. Computational Lower Bound. In this section, we give a computational
lower bound based on an optimal online algorithm for uniformly distributed costs.
This gives a slightly higher lower bound than the analytical bound above. We
implemented the optimal online algorithm presented in § 3 in exact arithmetic,
using rounding to prevent numbers from getting too large. The algorithm achieves
a competitive ratio of 2.148 for an instance with 10,000 time steps, see Figure 3. We
describe the details on the computational lower bound in the following paragraphs.
For the uniform distribution, we know from Lemma 4.1 that the optimal offline
algorithm has expected cost Hn+1− 1. On the other hand, the entry C(n, 0) in the
dynamic programming table of the optimal online algorithm gives the optimal cost
for an instance with n days. Therefore, for every n > 0 the ratio C(n,0)Hn+1−1 provides a
lower bound on the best strict competitive ratio achievable by any online algorithm.
We implemented the optimal online algorithm for the uniform case, and com-
puted the expression above for increasing values of n. In order to obtain a conclusive
proof, one needs to implement the algorithm in exact rational arithmetic. However,
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Algorithm 3: A 6.052 competitive algorithm for arbitrary distributions.
q ← 1 ; // threshold quantile index
τ ← δq ; // threshold cost
t← 1 ; // time with threshold
for i← 1, . . . , n do
t← t− 1 ;
if xi ≤ τ then
while xi ≤ τ do
q ← q/2; τ ← δq ;
if i+ 2/q > n then
hire applicant i until time n ;
stop ;
hire applicant i for 2/q time steps ;
t← 1/q ;
else if t = 0 then
q ← 2q; τ ← δq; t← 1/q ;
in doing so, we found that the size of the numerators and denominators grow very
quickly in n, and already for n = 22 both the numerator and the denominator have
over a million digits. This makes it computationally intractable to compute C(n,0)Hn+1−1
for large n.
To address this, we adopted a rounding scheme: after computing C(i, j) for
some i and j, we rounded the number down to another rational with a smaller
numerator and denominator, and then stored the rounded number in the dynamic
programming table. Since we only ever round down, the resulting costs computed
by the algorithm must always be cheaper than the expected cost of the optimal
online algorithm. Therefore, the computed value of C(n,0)Hn+1−1 is still a lower bound
on the strict competitive ratio that can be achieved.
Ultimately, we found that for n = 10, 000 the competitive ratio can be no better
than 2.148. The following theorem summarizes the results.
Theorem 4.9. For a uniform distribution, no online algorithm has strict compet-
itive ratio below 2.148.
5. Arbitrary Distributions
In this section, we generalize Algorithm 2 for the choice of c = 1 to an arbitrary
distribution X (cf. Algorithm 3). Whenever we halve our threshold in the course
of Algorithm 2, we essentially halve the probability mass of X below the threshold
(i.e., the probability that a drawn value lies below τ). To achieve the same effect
with respect to an arbitrary distribution X, we consider quantiles δq of X, defined
by the property that Pr [x ≤ δq] = q for continuous distributions3. Algorithm 3
changes the threshold by halving and doubling q and using τ = δq, which results in
the same behavior as Algorithm 2 when X is uniform. Therefore we can in principle
analyze the algorithm for general distributions using a Markov chain similar to that
3In general, we need to define δq more carefully via Pr [x ≤ δq ] ≥ q and Pr [x ≥ δq ] ≥ 1− q.
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Figure 4. Markov chain N ′ modeling the expected number of
hired applicants of Algorithm 3.
in § 4.2. Specifically, the Markov chain again governs the evolution of the value
q = 2−j , j = 0, 1, 2, . . . and the corresponding threshold value τ = δq in the course
of Algorithm 3. After finding an applicant with a cost xi below the threshold value
τ , the value of q is halved until δq < xi ≤ δq−1. Since the applicant is then hired for
2/q time steps where q is the value after the halving, we conclude that when hiring
an applicant below the threshold of δq it is hired for 4/q time units. As the process
stops at the latest when 4/q ≥ n, the Markov chain N ′ has states A0, A1, . . . , Ak
and B0, B1, . . . , Bk with k = dlog ne − 2, see Figure 4.
Again, we start in state A0, Bk is the absorbing state, and states Aj , Bj corre-
spond to states of the algorithm where τ = δ2−j . The transition probability from
any state Aj to state Bj is bounded from below by p = 1−1/e, since the probability
of not finding any applicant of cost at most δq within 1/q steps is
1−Pr[x > δq]1/q = 1− (1−Pr[x ≤ δq])1/q ≥ 1− (1− q)1/q ≥ 1− 1/e.
The analysis of the algorithm for arbitrary distributions, however, turns out to
be more intricate than for the uniform case for two main reasons. First, for uniform
distributions it was sufficient to count the total number of transitions from an A-
state to a B-state as any such transition corresponds to the hiring of a candidate
with a total cost of 2. On the other hand, for general distributions we need to bound
the number of transitions from state Bj to state Aj+1 for each j individually, as
the resulting costs may differ among the different values of j. The following lemma
provides a bound independent of j.
Lemma 5.1. Starting in state A0 of Markov chain N
′, for each j ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}
the expected number of transitions from Bj to Aj+1 is at most
p
3p−1 , where p =
1− 1/e.
Proof. Proof. With the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.5, we obtain an
upper bound on the expected number of transitions from Bj to Aj+1 by considering
the Markov chain Nˆ(p, k) with homogenous transition probability p = 1 − 1/e and
k = dlog ne−2. For the latter Markov chain, Lemma 8.3 proven in § 8.2 establishes
the result. 
The second main issue when analyzing the competitive ratio of the algorithm is
the lack of a concrete value for Optn for general distributions. Thus, we need the
following lemma that expresses E
[
Optn] as a sum over conditional expectations of
the form E
[
x | δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r
]
.
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Lemma 5.2. Let n ∈ N, k=dlog ne−2 and η := 52 − 556e2 ≈ 1.259. Then, we have
E
[
Optn
] ≥ k−1∑
r=0
2r−1E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r]+ η2k−1E[x ∣∣x ≤ δ2−k].
Proof. Proof. By linearity of expectation E
[
Optn
]
=
∑
i∈[n]E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
]
where for i ∈ [n] the random variables x1, . . . , xi are drawn independently from
X. To prove the claim we proceed to express for fixed i ∈ [n] the expectation
E[min{x1, . . . , xi}] in terms of E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k] and E[x | δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r ] with
r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. To this end, for i ∈ [n] and r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} let
Ei,r,=1 =
[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ (δ2−(r+1) , δ2−r ]∣∣ = 1 and ∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ (δ2−(r+1) , δ1]∣∣ = i]
be the stochastic event that the minimum of the i draws x1 ∼ X, . . . , xi ∼ X is
in the interval (δ2−(r+1) , δ2−r ] and none of the other i− 1 draws is in that interval.
Additionally, let
Ei,k,=1 =
[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ2−k ]∣∣ = 1].
Further, for r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, let
Ei,r,>1 =
[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ (δ2−(r+1) , δ2−r ]∣∣ > 1 and ∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ (δ2−(r+1) , δ1]∣∣ = i]
be the stochastic event that the minimum of the i draws x1 ∼ X, . . . , xi ∼ X is
in the interval (δ2−(r+1) , δ2−r ] and at least one of the other i − 1 draws is in that
interval. Similarly, let
Ei,k,>1 =
[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ2−k ]∣∣ > 1].
For fixed i the events Ei,r,=1 and Ei,r,>1 for r ∈ {0, . . . , k} are clearly disjoint.
Since
∑k
r=0(Pr[Ei,r,=1]+Pr[Ei,r,>1]) = 1, by the law of total expectation, we have
E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
]
=
k∑
r=0
(
E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
∣∣Ei,r,=1]Pr[Ei,r,=1]
+E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
∣∣Ei,r,>1]Pr[Ei,r,>1]).
We observe that E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
∣∣Ei,r,=1] = E[x ∣∣ δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r] for all
r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and, similarly, E[min{x1 . . . , xi} ∣∣Ei,k,=1] = E[x ∣∣x ≤ δ2−k].
In addition, we have E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
∣∣Ei,r,>1] ≥ δ2−(r+1) ≥ E[x ∣∣ δ2−(r+2) < x ≤
δ2−(r+1)
]
for all r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. We then obtain
E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
] ≥ E[x ∣∣ δ2−1 < x ≤ δ1]Pr[Ei,0,=1]
+
k−1∑
r=1
E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(r+1)<x≤δ2−r](Pr[Ei,r,=1]+Pr[Ei,r−1,>1])
+E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k](Pr[Ei,k,=1]+Pr[Ei,k−1,>1]),
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and hence
E
[
Optn
] ≥ E[x ∣∣ δ2−1 < x ≤ δ1] n∑
i=1
Pr
[
Ei,0,=1
]
+
k−1∑
r=1
(
E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r] n∑
i=1
(
Pr
[
Ei,r,=1
]
+Pr
[
Ei,r−1,>1
]))
+E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k] n∑
i=1
(
Pr
[
Ei,k,=1
]
+Pr
[
Ei,k−1,>1
])
.
The probability that a single draw falls in the range (δ2−(r+1) , δ2−r ] and i− 1 draws
are larger than δ2−r is 2
−(r+1)(1− 2−r)i−1. Since there are i possibilities which of
the draws falls in this range, we have
Pr
[
Ei,r,=1
]
=

0 if r = 0 and i > 1
1/2 if r = 0 and i = 1
i2−(r+1)(1− 2−r)i−1 if r ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
i2−r(1− 2−r)i−1 if r = k.
Similarly, for r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have
Pr
[
Ei,r−1,>1
]
= (1− 2−r)i − (1− 2−(r−1))i −Pr[Ei,r−1,=1]
= (1− 2−r)i − (1− 2−(r−1))i − i2−r(1− 2−(r−1))i−1.
We then obtain
E[Optn
] ≥ E[x ∣∣ δ2−1 < x ≤ δ1] · 2−1
+
k−1∑
r=1
E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(r+1) < x ≤ δ2−r] · α(r, n)
+E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k] · α(k, n)
with
α(r, n) =
n∑
i=1
(
Pr
[
Ei,r,=1
]
+Pr
[
Ei,r−1,>1
])
.(7)
It remains to show that α(r, n) ≥ 2r−1 for 1 ≤ r < k and α(k, n) ≥ η2k−1. We have
α(k, n) =
n∑
i=1
(
Pr
[
Ei,r,=1
]
+Pr
[
Ei,r−1,>1
])(8)
which gives
α(r, n) =
n∑
i=1
i2−r(1−2−r)i−1 + (1−2−r)i − (1−2−(r−1))i − i2−r(1−2−(r−1))i−1
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if r = k, and
α(r, n) =
n∑
i=1
i2−(r+1)(1−2−r)i−1 + (1−2−r)i − (1−2−(r−1))i − i2−r(1−2−(r−1))i−1
for r 6= k.
To prove the lemma, we proceed to show that infn∈N infr∈{0,...,dlogne−3}
α(r,n)
2r−1 ≥
1 and infn∈N
α(dlogne−2,n)
2dlogne−3 ≥ η. Differentiating the well-known formula for the
geometric sum
∑n
i=1 a
i = a−a
n+1
1−a , we obtain
∑n
i=1 ia
i−1 = na
n+1−(n+1)an+1
(1−a)2 . We
use both formulas to simplify all partial sums. For a binary event E, we denote
by χE the indicator variable for event E, i.e., χE = 1 if E is true, and χE = 0,
otherwise. For r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we then obtain
α(r, n) = (1 + χr=k)2
r−1[n(1− 2−r)n+1 − (n+ 1)(1− 2−r)n + 1]
+ 2r
[
1− 2−r − (1− 2−r)n+1]
− 2r−1[1− 2−(r−1)− (1− 2−(r−1))n+1]
− 2r−2[n(1− 2−(r−1))n+1 − (n+ 1)(1− 2−(r−1))n + 1]
= 2r−1
[
(1 + χr=k)
(
n(1− 2−r)n+1 − (n+ 1)(1− 2−r)n + 1
)
+ 2− 2−(r−1) − 2(1− 2−r)n+1
− 1 + 2−(r−1) + (1− 2−(r−1))n+1
− n
2
(1− 2−(r−1))n+1 + n+ 1
2
(1− 2−(r−1))n − 1
2
]
= 2r−1
[
3
2
+ χr=k
+ (1− 2−r)n
(
n(1 + χr=k)(1− 2−r)− (n+ 1)(1 + χr=k)− 2(1− 2−r)
)
+ (1− 2−(r−1))n
(
(1− 2−(r−1))− n
2
(1− 2−(r−1)) + n+ 1
2
)]
= 2r−1
[
3
2
+ χr=k + (1− 2−r)n(2−(r−1) − n2−r(1 + χr=k)− 3− χr=k)
+ (1− 2−(r−1))n
(
3
2
+ n2−r − 2−(r−1)
)]
= 2r−1
[
3
2
+ χr=k +
(
(1− 2−r)n − (1− 2−(r−1))n
)(
2−(r−1) − n2−r − 3
2
)
−
(
3
2
+ χr=k(1 + n2
−r)
)
(1− 2−r)n
]
.
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As the probabilities are non-negative, α(r, n) =
∑n
i=1(Pr[Ei,r,=1] + Pr[Ei,r−1,>1])
is non-decreasing in n for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We proceed to show that α(r, n) ≥ 2r−1
for all r ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} = {0, . . . , dlog ne−3}. Since r, n are integral, r ≤ dlog ne−3
implies n ≥ 2r+2 + 1. Using monotonicity of α(r, n) and substituting t := 2r, we
have
infn∈N infr∈{1,...,dlogne−3}
α(r, n)
2r−1
= infr∈N infn∈{2r+2+1,... }
α(r, n)
2r−1
= infr∈N
α(r, 2r+2 + 1)
2r−1
= infr∈N
{
3
2
+
(
(1−2−r)2r+2+1−(1−2−(r−1))2r+2+1
)(
2−(r−1)−(2r+2 + 1)2−r− 3
2
)
− 3
2
(1− 2−r)2r+2+1
}
≥ inft∈N
{
3
2
+
((
1− 1
t
)4t+1
−
(
1− 2
t
)4t+1)(
2
t
−4− 1
t
− 3
2
)
− 3
2
(
1− 1
t
)4t+1}
= inft∈N
{
3
2
+
((
1− 1
t
)4t+1
−
(
1− 2
t
)4t+1)(
1
t
− 11
2
)
− 3
2
(
1− 1
t
)4t+1}
.
The first order Taylor approximation of the function f(x) = x4t+1 at x = 1 − 1/t
gives f(1− 2/t) = (1− 2/t)4t+1 = (1− 1/t)4t+1 − 4t+1t (1− 1/t)4t + R2, with R2 ≥ 0
as f is convex. This implies
infn∈N infr∈{1,...,dlogne−2}
α(r, n)
2r−1
≥ inft∈N
{
3
2
− 4t+ 1
t
(
11
2
− 1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)4t
− 3
2
(
1− 1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)4t}
= inft∈N
{
3
2
−
(
47
2
− 1
t2
)(
1− 1
t
)4t}
≥ inft∈N
{
3
2
− 47
2
(
1− 1
t
)4t}
.
As the latter expression is decreasing in t, we have
infn∈N infr∈{1,...,dlogne−3}
α(r, n)
2r−1
≥ lim
t→∞
{
3
2
− 47
2
(1− 1
t
)4t
}
=
3
2
− 47
2e4
≈ 1.069 > 1.
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It remains to show that α(k,n)
2k−1 ≥ η. For r = k = dlog ne − 2, we have
α(k, n) = 2k−1
[
5
2
+
(
(1− 2−k)n − (1− 2−(k−1))n
)(
2−(k−1) − n2−k − 3
2
)
−
(
5
2
+ n2−k
)
(1− 2−k)n
]
.
Again, as α(r, n) is non-decreasing in n, this value is minimal for n = 2k+1 + 1.
Substituting t = 2k, we obtain
inf
n∈N
α(dlog ne − 2, n)
2dlogne−3
= inf
k∈N
α(k, 2k+1 + 1)
2k−1
= inf
k∈N
{
5
2
+
(
(1−2−k)2k+1+1 − (1−2−(k−1))2k+1+1
)(
2−(k−1) − (2k+1+1)2−k − 3
2
)
−
(
5
2
+ (2k+1 + 1)2−k
)
(1− 2−k)2k+1+1
}
≥ inf
t∈N
t≥2
{
5
2
+
((
1− 1
t
)2t+1
−
(
1− 2
t
)2t+1)(
2
t
−2− 1
t
− 3
2
)
−
(
5
2
+2+
1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)2t+1}
= inf
t∈N
t≥2
{
5
2
+
((
1− 1
t
)2t+1
−
(
1− 2
t
)2t+1)(
1
t
− 7
2
)
−
(
9
2
+
1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)2t+1}
.
By second-order Taylor approximation of the function f(x) = x2t+1 at x = (1−1/t),
we obtain
f(1− 2
t
) =
(
1− 2
t
)2t+1
=
(
1− 1
t
)2t+1
− 2t+ 1
t
(
1− 1
t
)2t
+
2t(2t+ 1)
2t2
(
1− 1
t
)2t−1
− 2t(2t+ 1)(2t− 1)
6t3
(
1− 1
t
)2t−2
+R4,
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where the remainder is R4 ≥ 0, as the fourth derivative is non-negative. (This can
easily be seen when expressing the remainder in Lagrange form.) We then obtain
inf
n∈N
α(dlog ne − 2, n)
2dlogne−3
≥ inf
t∈N
t≥2
{
5
2
+
[
2t+ 1
t
(
1− 1
t
)2t
− 2t+ 1
t
(
1− 1
t
)2t−1
+
(2t+ 1)(2t− 1)
3t2
(
1− 1
t
)2t−2][
1
t
− 7
2
]
−
(
9
2
+
1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)2t+1}
= inf
t∈N
t≥2
{
5
2
+
(
1− 1
t
)2t[(
2t+ 1
t
− 2t+ 1
t− 1 +
(2t+ 1)(2t− 1)
3(t− 1)2
)(
1
t
− 7
2
)
−
(
9
2
+
1
t
)(
1− 1
t
)]}
= inf
t∈N
t≥2
{
5
2
− 55t
4 − 125t3 + 89t2 + 8t− 12
6t2(t− 1)2
(
1− 1
t
)2t}
.
It is straightforward to check that (1−1/t)2t and 55t4−125t3+89t2+8t−126t2(t−1)2 are increasing
in t. This implies
inf
k∈N
α(k, 2k+1 + 1)
2k−1
= lim
t→∞
{
5
2
− 55t
4 − 125t3 + 89t2 + 8t− 12
6t2(t− 1)2
(
1− 1
t
)2t}
=
5
2
− 55
6e2
≈ 1.259,
which finishes the proof. 
Combining Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 3 is 6.052-competitive for arbitrary distributions.
Proof. Proof. For n ≤ 4, Algorithm 3 hires the first applicant for the whole time
which gives 4-approximation. For the following arguments, assume that n ≥ 5, and
let k = dlog ne − 2 ≥ 1.
Algorithm 3 hires an applicant, whenever the Markov chain transitions from
a state Bj to Aj+1 and hires the final applicant when it reaches state Bk. By
Lemma 5.1 for each j, the expected number of transitions from state Bj to Aj+1
is at most p3p−1 where p = 1 − 1/e. Each applicant who is hired while transition-
ing from Bj to Aj+1 is hired for 2
j+2 time units, and its expected cost value is
E [x | δ2−(j+1) ≤ x ≤ δ2−j ]. The final applicant hired when state Bk is reached is
hired for at most n time units and has expected cost with value E[x |x ≤ δ2−k ].
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Since the number of visits to a state and the cost for hiring an applicant in the
state are stochastically independent, we obtain
E [Algn] ≤ p
3p− 1
k−1∑
j=0
(
2j+2E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(j+1) < x ≤ δ2−j ])+ nE[x |x ≤ δ2−k ]
=
1− 1/e
2− 3/e
k−1∑
j=0
(
2j+2E
[
x
∣∣ δ2−(j+1) < x ≤ δ2−j ])+ nE[x |x ≤ δ2−k ]
≤ 8e− 8
2e− 3E[Optn] + n
(
1− e− 1
2e− 3η
)
E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k],(9)
where we used Lemma 5.2 and where η = 52 − 556e2 . Further, recall that E[Optn] =∑n
i=1E[min{x1, . . . , xi}]. For i ∈ [n], we have
E
[
min{x1, . . . , xi}
] ≥ E[x ∣∣x ≤ δ2−k]Pr[|{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ2−k ]| ≤ 1]
≥ E[x ∣∣x ≤ δ2−k]Pr[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ4/n]∣∣ ≤ 1]
= E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k](Pr [∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ4/n]∣∣ = 0]
+Pr
[∣∣{x1, . . . , xi} ∩ [0, δ4/n]∣∣ = 1])
= E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k]
((
1− 4
n
)i
+
4i
n
(
1− 4
n
)i−1)
,
which implies (for n ≥ 5)
E
[
Optn] ≥ E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k] n∑
i=1
((
1− 4
n
)i
+
4i
n
(
1− 4
n
)i−1)
= E
[
x
∣∣x ≤ δ2−k]
(
n
2
(
1− 3
(
1− 4
n
)n)
+
(
1− 4
n
)n
− 1
)
≥ E[x ∣∣x ≤ δ2−k]
(
n
2
(
1− 3
e4
)
+
(
1− 4
n
)n
− 1
)
.(10)
Combining (10) with (9) and using n ≥ 5, we obtain
E[Algn] ≤ 8e− 8
2e− 3E[Optn] +
1− e−12e−3 ( 52 − 556e2 )
1
2
(
1− 3e4
)
+
(
1− 4n
)n − 1n E[Optn]
≤
(
8e− 8
2e− 3 +
1− e−12e−3 ( 52 − 556e2 )
1
2
(
1− 3e4
)
+
(
1− 45
)5 − 15
)
E[Optn] ≤ 6.052 ·E[Optn]
as claimed. 
6. Unknown Distributions
In this section, we again consider an arbitrary distribution X with distribution
function F . In contrast to before, we assume thatX is unknown to us. In particular,
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we do not have access to the quantiles of X. We first give a bound for the cost
of the offline optimum that does not rely on quantiles. In the following, we let
E [x] := Ex∼X
[
x
]
.
Lemma 6.1. For arbitrary distributions X, E [Optn] ≥ E [x]+
∑blognc
i=1 2
i−1 ∫∞
0
(1−
F (x))2
i
dx.
Proof. Proof. Since the left hand side of the inequality to prove is increasing in
n while the right hand side only increases when n is a power of 2, we may as-
sume without loss of generality that n is a power of 2. By Proposition 2, we have
E [Optn] =
∑
i∈[n]
∫∞
0
(1− F (x))i dx. Using that (1− F (x))i is decreasing with i,
we split the sum into the ranges (n/2, n], (n/4, n/2], (n/8, n/4], . . . and bound each part
by the last term in the corresponding range, i.e.,
E [Optn] = E [x] +
∑n
i=2
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))i dx
≥ E [x] + n
2
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))n dx+ n
4
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))n/2 dx+ . . .
· · ·+
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2 dx
= E [x] +
∑logn
i=1
n
2i
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))n/2i−1 dx
= E [x] +
∑logn
i=1
2logn−i
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2logn−i+1 dx
= E [x] +
∑logn−1
i=0
2i
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2i+1 dx
= E [x] +
∑logn
i=1
2i−1
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2i dx,
as claimed. 
We now describe our algorithm for unknown distributions (cf. Algorithm 4).
Without knowledge of the quantiles of X, we have no good way to directly adjust
the cost threshold τ . Instead, for some integral value λ > 1 to be fixed later, we
devote a 1/λ+1 fraction of the time spent in each state j to sample X in order
to estimate a suitable value for τ and then wait for an appropriate candidate to
appear. Specifically, in state j we sample for 2j−1 time units and then observe the
applicants for another λ(2j − 1) time units. Thus, the maximum number of time
units spent in state j is t¯j = (1 + λ)(2
j − 1). When observing the applicants we
hire any candidate whose cost does not exceed the minimum cost while sampling.
The hiring time is tj = (1 + λ)2
j+2 time units. Since
j+1∑
i=0
t¯i = (1 + λ)
j+1∑
i=0
(2i − 1) = (1 + λ)(2j+2 − j − 3) ≤ tj
we are guaranteed to hire a new applicant (or terminate the algorithm) during the
hiring time.
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Algorithm 4: A 48-competitive algorithm for unknown distributions.
τ ←∞ ; // threshold cost
tsample ← 0 ; // remaining time until threshold is fixed
twait ← 1 ; // remaining time once threshold is fixed
j ← 0 ; // state of the algorithm
for i← 1, . . . , n do
if tsample > 0 then
τ ← min{τ, xi};
tsample ← tsample − 1;
else if twait > 0 then
twait ← twait − 1;
if xi ≤ τ then
hire applicant i for (1 + λ)2j+2 time steps;
if i+ (1 + λ)2j+2 > n then
stop;
j ← j + 1; τ ←∞; tsample ← 2j − 1; twait ← λtsample;
else
j ← j − 1; τ ←∞; tsample ← 2j − 1; twait ← λtsample;
0 1 2 . . . k−1 k
1
1/λ+1
λ/λ+1
1/λ+1
λ/λ+1
1/λ+1
λ/λ+1
1/λ+1
1/λ+1
Figure 5. Markov chain M(p, k) with p = λ/(λ+ 1).
The maximum value of j that can be reached during the execution of the algo-
rithm is bounded by the fact that (1 + λ)2j+2 ≤ n, i.e., j ≤ dlog n1+λe − 2.
Again, we introduce a Markov chain that has one state for each possible value
of j and an absorbing state k, see Figure 5. The probability that we do not hire an
applicant in state j with 0 < j < k equals the probability that the smallest cost ob-
served while sampling is lower than the smallest cost observed while waiting. Since
twait = λtsample, we have a hiring probability of p = λ/λ+1. With this probability,
the Markov chain transitions to state j + 1, otherwise to state j − 1.
As the Markov chain already has homogenous transition probabilities equal to
p = λ/(λ+ 1), Lemma 8.1 directly implies the following result.
Lemma 6.2. The expected number of visits to each state j of the Markov chain is
at most 12p−1 .
Combining Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 yields the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.3. For λ = 3, Algorithm 4 is strictly 48-competitive for unknown
distributions.
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Proof. Proof. Using Lemma 6.2 with p = λλ+1 , we conclude that the algorithm visits
each state at most 12p−1 =
λ+1
λ−1 times in expectation. In state j with 0 < j < k with
probability p = λλ+1 an applicant is hired for (1 +λ)2
j+2 units of time. The cost of
the applicant is determined by drawing 2j − 1 numbers to determine a minimum
τ , and then continuing to draw until we find the first cost smaller than τ . We can
bound the expected cost of the applicant by the expected cost when drawing 2j
numbers and taking the minimum, i.e.,
E [x |x ≤ τ ] ≤ Exi∼X [mini∈{1,...,2j}{xi}] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx.
The algorithm stops at the latest when an applicant is hired in state k − 1 =
dlog nλ+1e − 2 as the applicant is hired for at least n time steps. Since the number
of visits to a state, the probability of hiring in a state, and the expected cost when
hiring are independent, we obtain
E [Algn] ≤ λ(λ+ 1)
λ− 1
k∑
j=0
(
2j+2
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx
)
.
Together with Lemma 6.1 and k − 1 ≤ blog nc − 2, this yields
E [Algn]
E [Optn]
≤ 4E [x]
(λ+1)2
λ−1 +
∑k−1
j=1
(λ(λ+1)
λ−1 2
j+2
∫∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx)
E [x] +
∑blognc
j=1 2
j−1 ∫∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx
≤ max
{
4E [x] (λ+1)
2
λ−1
E [x]
,
∑k−1
j=1
(λ(λ+1)
λ−1 2
j+2
∫∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx)∑blognc
j=1 2
j−1 ∫∞
0
(1− F (x))2j dx
}
≤ max
{
4
(λ+ 1)2
λ− 1 , 8
λ(λ+ 1)
λ− 1
}
≤ 48,
as claimed. 
7. Sequential Employment
We now turn our attention to the number of applicants that are concurrently
under employment. We show that there is no constant competitive algorithm for
the problem that the covering constraint for the required number of employed
candidates is fulfilled with equality in every step.
We can easily adapt the algorithms in the previous sections to be competitive in
a setting where not more than two applicants may be employed during any period
of time.
Lemma 7.1. We can adapt each of the above algorithms to employ not more than
two applicants concurrently and ensure them to only lose a factor of at most 2 in
their competitive ratio.
Proof. Proof. We double the hiring times of the algorithms and stay idle during
the first half of the hiring period, i.e., we discard all applicants encountered during
that period. This doubling causes a loss of a factor not larger than 2. Further, it
has the effect that after waiting for half of the hiring time, effectively, the remaining
hiring time is as before. This in turn implies that the employment period of any
previously hired applicant runs out while staying idle for a new applicant. This
is because the hiring time of a new applicant was defined to be larger than the
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Algorithm 5: An optimal online algorithm for sequential employment.
for i← 1, . . . , n do
if xi < τn−i =
En−i
n−i then
hire applicant i for remaining time n− i+ 1;
stop;
else
hire applicant i for one unit of time;
remaining hiring time of the previous one, and thus only ever two applicants are
employed concurrently. 
Lemma 7.1 allows us to generalize our algorithms for input sequences of unknown
length. Without knowledge of n, we cannot stop our algorithm once an applicant is
hired for more than the remaining time. However, if no more than two applicants
are employed concurrently, it is guaranteed that we never employ more than a single
additional applicant.
Corollary 7.2. Algorithms 1–4 can be adapted to be competitive even when n is
not known.
The question remains, whether we can stay competitive when only a single appli-
cant may be employed at a time. We refer to this setting as the setting of sequential
employment. In the remaining part of this section, we show that the competitive
ratio is Ω(
√
n/ log n) for any online algorithm, even when X = U [0, 1]. Note that
the offline optimum only uses sequential employment.
Let En denote the expected cost of the best online algorithm for n applicants un-
der sequential employment. We give an optimal online algorithm (cf. Algorithm 5)
based on the values E1,E2, . . . ,En−1. Since a single applicant needs to be employed
at any time, the only decision of the algorithm regards the respective hiring times.
Interestingly, our algorithm hires all but the last applicant only for a single unit of
time.
Before we prove this result, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 7.3. The function G(τ) := Pr [x ≥ τ ] (τ −E [x |x ≥ τ ]) is non-decreasing.
Proof. Proof. We rewrite G(τ) = τPr [x ≥ τ ]−∫∞
τ
xf(x) dx where f is the density
of X. Then, for τ ′ > τ , we have
G(τ ′)−G(τ) = τ ′Pr [x ≥ τ ′]− τPr [x ≥ τ ] +
∫ τ ′
τ
xf(x) dx
≥ τ ′
∫ ∞
τ ′
f(x) dx− τ
∫ ∞
τ
f(x) dx+ τ
∫ τ ′
τ
f(x) dx
≥ 0,
which concludes the proof. 
We are now in position to prove that Algorithm 5 is optimal.
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Theorem 7.4. Algorithm 5 is an optimal online algorithm for sequential employ-
ment.
Proof. Proof. Let τi := Ei/i be the threshold employed by Algorithm 5 when i
applicants remain. For technical reasons, let τ0 be any constant greater than τ1.
We prove the theorem by induction on n, additionally showing that τn ≤ τn−1. For
n = 1, the algorithm is obviously optimal and τ1 ≤ τ0 by definition. Consider the
first applicant of cost x1. With E0 := 0, the expected cost of the optimal online
algorithm follows the recursion
min
t∈{1,...,n}
{x1t+En−t}.(11)
Consider the case x1 < τn−1 = En−1/(n − 1). We proceed to show that the
minimum (11) is attained for t = n. By induction, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, we
have x1 < τn−1 ≤ τt, and thus
nx1 = tx1 + (n− t)x1 < tx1 +En−t.
Now consider the case x1 ≥ τn−1. We need to show that the minimum (11) is
attained for t = 1. By induction, for all t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we have τn−1 ≤ τn−t, and
thus
tx1 +En−t = x1 + (t− 1)x1 + (n− t)τn−t
≥ x1 + (t− 1)τn−1 + (n− t)τn−1
= x1 +En−1.
It remains to show τn ≤ τn−1. From the above, we have
En = nPr [x < τn−1]E [x |x < τn−1] +Pr [x ≥ τn−1] (E [x |x ≥ τn−1] +En−1).
Using
E [x] = Pr [x < τn−1]E [x |x < τn−1] +Pr [x ≥ τn−1]E [x |x ≥ τn−1] ,
this yields
τn = E [x] +
1
n
Pr [x ≥ τn−1]
(
En−1 − (n− 1)E [x |x ≥ τn−1]
)
= E [x] +
n− 1
n
Pr [x ≥ τn−1] (τn−1 −E [x |x ≥ τn−1]).
Using Lemma 7.3 (with τn−1 ≤ τn−2 by induction) and the fact that the second
term is negative, we obtain
τn ≤ E [x] + n− 2
n− 1Pr [x ≥ τn−1] (τn−1 −E [x |x ≥ τn−1])
≤ E [x] + n− 2
n− 1Pr [x ≥ τn−2] (τn−2 −E [x |x ≥ τn−2])
= τn−1,
which concludes the proof. 
We derive the optimal competitive ratio for the case where X = U [0, 1].
Lemma 7.5. For X = U [0, 1], we have
En =
{
1/2, forn = 1,
En−1 + 1/2− E
2
n−1
2(n−1) , forn > 1.
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Proof. Proof. The case n = 1 follows from E [x] = 1/2. For n > 1, we use the fact
that Algorithm 5 is optimal. We obtain
En = nPr [x < τn−1]E [x |x < τn−1] +Pr [x ≥ τn−1] (E [x |x ≥ τn−1] +En−1)
= nτn−1 · 1
2
τn−1 + (1− τn−1)
(
1 + τn−1
2
+En−1
)
=
nτ2n−1
2
+
1
2
+En−1 − 1
2
τ2n−1 −En−1τn−1
= En−1 +
1
2
− E
2
n−1
2(n− 1) ,
which concludes the proof. 
With this, we can bound the expected cost of any online algorithm.
Lemma 7.6. For X = U [0, 1], we have √n+ 1− 1 ≤ En ≤
√
n.
Proof. Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that En >
√
n for some value
of n. With Lemma 7.5, we obtain
En+1 = En +
1
2
− E
2
n
2n
< En +
1
2
− n
2n
= En,
which is a contradiction with En being non-decreasing.
Let h(n) :=
√
n+ 1 − 1. It is easy to check that En ≥ h(n) for n < 7. For
n ≥ 7, we use induction on n. To that end, assume En ≥ h(n) holds and consider
En+1. Clearly, En+1 ≥ En. If En ≥
√
n+ 1 − 0.8, it thus suffices to show that
h(n+ 1)− h(n) ≤ 0.2. Since h is concave and n ≥ 7, we indeed have
h(n+ 1)− h(n) ≤ h′(n) = 1
2
√
n+ 1
≤ 0.2.
Finally, let En <
√
n+ 1 − 0.8. Using n ≥ 7, we show that En grows faster than
h(n):
En+1 −En = 1
2
− E
2
n
2n
≥ 1
2
− (
√
n+ 1− 0.8)2
2n
=
160
√
n+ 1− 164
200n
≥
√
n+ 1
2(n+ 1)
= h′(n) ≥ h(n+ 1)− h(n),
which concludes the proof. 
Together with Lemma 4.1, we immediately get the following bound on the com-
petitive ratio of any online algorithm.
Theorem 7.7. The competitive ratio of the best online algorithm for sequential
employment and a uniform distribution X = U [0, 1] is Θ (
√
n/ log n).
8. Analysis of the Markov Chains
In this section, we study the Markov chains that govern the evolution of the
threshold values of our algorithms.
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Figure 6. Markov chain used in § 4.1 and § 6. Nodes correspond
to states.
8.1. Markov Chain Mˆ(p, k). We start with the simple Markov chain Mˆ(p, k)
used in § 4.1 and § 6. The Markov chain has states 0, . . . , k and transition proba-
bilities as shown in Figure 6.
In the following, we compute the expected number of visits to each state.
Lemma 8.1. Let p > 1/2 and k ∈ N. Starting in state 0, the expected number of
visits to each state j of the Markov chain Mˆ(p, k) is at most 12p−1 .
Proof. Proof. Let vj denote the expected number of visits to state j, when starting
from state 0. We derive that the values vj , j ∈ {0, . . . , k} satisfy the following
equations
vk = 1,(12a)
vk = pvk−1,(12b)
vk−1 = pvk−2,(12c)
vj = (1− p)vj+1 + pvj−1 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , k − 2},(12d)
v1 = v0 + (1− p)v2,(12e)
v0 = 1 + (1− p)v1,(12f)
where (12a) follows from the fact that k is the absorbing state, (12b) uses that state
k is reached only from state k − 1. Equation (12c) follows since state k − 1 can be
reached from state k − 2 only. Equation (12d) follows from the fact, that we reach
state j from j−1 and j+1 and leave states j−1 and j+1 to j with a probability of
p and 1− p, respectively. As state 0 is left with probability 1 towards its successor,
Equation (12e) holds as special case. Further, for state 0, we get Equation (12f)
since 0 is the starting state and can only be reached from state 1.
Note that (12a) and (12b) imply vk−1 = 1/p which by (12c) implies vk−2 = 1/p2.
With these start values (12d) uniquely defines a homogenous recurrence relation
on v1, . . . , vk−1 with
vj =
1
p
vj+1 − 1− p
p
vj+2 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , k − 2}.
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Solving this recurrence by the method of characteristic equations yields that the
characteristic polynomial x2 − 1px+ 1−pp has roots 1p − 1 and 1 so that the explicit
solution is
vj = λ1
(
1
p
− 1
)k−j−1
+ λ2
for some parameters λ1, λ2 ∈ R. Choosing λ1 and λ2 such that the equations
vk−1 = 1/p and vk−2 = 1/p2 are satisfied gives
λ1 =
1
2p− 1
(
1− 1
p
)
, λ2 =
1
p
− 1
2p− 1
(
1− 1
p
)
.
As a result, for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we obtain
vj =
1
2p− 1
(
1− 1
p
)(
1
p
− 1
)k−j−1
+
1
p
− 1
2p− 1
(
1− 1
p
)
=
1
2p− 1
[(
1
p
− 1
)
−
(
1
p
− 1
)k−j]
+
1
p
.(13)
Finally, v0 is defined via (12f). Observe that, together with (13), this satisfies
(12e) as required.
It remains to show that vj ≤ 12p−1 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k}. For j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
we use Equation (13) and the fact that p > 1/2 to obtain
vj =
1
2p− 1
[(
1
p
− 1
)
−
(
1
p
− 1
)k−j]
+
1
p
≤ 1
2p− 1
(
1
p
− 1
)
+
1
p
=
p
p (2p− 1) =
1
2p− 1 .
For j = 0 we have by Equation (12f)
v0 = 1 + (1− p)v1 ≤ 1 + 1− p
2p− 1 =
p
2p− 1 ≤
1
2p− 1
which completes the proof. 
8.2. Markov Chain Nˆ(p, k). In this section, we study the Markov chain Nˆ(p, k)
used in § 4.2 and § 5. The Markov chain has states Aj and Bj , for j ∈ {0, . . . , k}
and transition probabilities as shown in Figure 7.
We start to bound the expected number of transitions from an A-state to a
B-state.
Lemma 8.2. Starting in state A0 of Markov chain Nˆ(p, k), the expected number
of transitions from an A-state to a B-state is at most
h =
kp
3p− 1 −
4p(1− 2p)
(3p− 1)2 +
(
1− p
3p− 1
)2(
2(1− p)
1 + p
)k
.
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Figure 7. Markov chain Nˆ(p, k) with homogenous transition
probability p and k + 1 states used in § 4.2 and § 5. Nodes corre-
spond to states.
Proof. Proof. Let aj (respectively bj) denote the expected number of transitions
from an A-state to a B-state, when starting from state Aj (respectively Bj). We
get
bk = 0,(14a)
bj =
1
2
bj+1 +
1
2
aj+1 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},(14b)
aj = p(bj + 1) + (1− p)aj−1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k},(14c)
a0 = 1 + b0.(14d)
Defining β = 2(1−p)1+p , for j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, it is straightforward to check that (14a),
(14b) and (14c) are fulfilled by
aj =
(k − j + 2)p
3p− 1 − β
j 2p(1− p)
(3p− 1)2 + β
k (1− p)2
(3p− 1)2 , and
bj =
(k − j)p
3p− 1 − β
j (1− p)2
(3p− 1)2 + β
k (1− p)2
(3p− 1)2 .
It follows that the expected number of transitions from an A-state to a B-state
when starting at A0 is
a0 =
(k + 2)p
3p− 1 −
2p(1− p)
(3p− 1)2 + β
k (1− p)2
(3p− 1)2
=
kp
3p− 1 −
4p(1− 2p)
(3p− 1)2 +
2k(1− p)k+2
(3p− 1)2(1 + p)k ,
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 8.3. Starting in state A0 of Markov chain Nˆ(p, k) for each j ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}
the expected number of transitions from Bj to Aj+1 is at most
p
3p−1 .
Proof. Proof. As the expected number of such transitions is half the expected
number of visits to state Bj , it suffices to bound the latter quantity.
Suppose we are in state Bj . The probability of coming back to Bj equals the
probability of hitting Aj from Bj . Denote by ai(j), bi(j) the hitting probability of
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state Ai from Aj and Bj , respectively. We have
bi(k) = 0,(15a)
bi(j) =
1
2
bi(j + 1) +
1
2
ai(j + 1) for all j ∈ {i, . . . , k − 1},(15b)
ai(j) = pbi(j) + (1− p)ai(j − 1) for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , k},(15c)
ai(i) = 1(15d)
Let β = 2(1−p)p+1 < 1 (as p > 1/3). It is easy to check that for j ∈ {i, . . . , k}
ai(j) ≤ βj−i
bi(j) ≤ 1− p
2p
βj−i,
gives an upper bound on the solution of (15) as these values satisfy equalities (15b),
(15c), (15d), and only overestimate (15a). We can interpret the visits to state Bj
after the first visit as a geometric random variable with success probability 1−bj(j).
Thus, the expected number of visits to Bj is given by
1 +
1− (1− bj(j))
1− bj(j) =
1
1− bj(j) ≤
1
1− 1−p2p
=
2p
3p− 1 .
We conclude that the expected number of transitions from Bj to Aj+1 is at most
p
3p−1 , proving the claim. 
9. Conclusion
We considered prophet inequalities with a covering constraint and a minimization
objective. We gave constant competitive algorithms for this type of problem and
established concurrent employment as a necessary feature of such algorithms.
We note that our results extend to slightly more general settings, where (a) we
relax the covering constraint by associating a penalty B <∞ with time steps where
no contract is active, (b) multiple applicants arrive in each time step, (c) applicants
may be hired fractionally.
A crucial limitation of our model is the assumption that costs are distributed
independently, and it remains an interesting question how to address correlated
costs.
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